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Box 1: Google Search Evidence Demonstrating the Existence of a Common View of 
Emotional Expressions 
This box provides perhaps the simplest characterization of the “common view” of 
emotional expressions: how it is represented in the internet. It is important to note that we are not 
suggesting that the common view is necessarily a view that individual scientists personally hold, 
nor is it a view that all laypeople personally hold. Instead, it is a view that most laypeople believe 
is supported by the scientific evidence, and a view that many scientists have perpetuated in the 
literature, intentionally or not. The common view is also the modal view that computer scientists, 
educators, and psychiatrists often draw from, on the assumption that it is the view currently best 
supported by scientific evidence; and this is the assumption we evaluated in our paper. 
The items retrieved from a Google search represent the consensus of our culture in many 
ways, and certainly represent what most people take as a summary of the conclusions best 
supported by current science evidence, broadly conceived. Since different search histories and 
browsers may produce somewhat different results, we asked 23 students and post-doctoral 
fellows to search the term “emotional facial expressions,” and send us a screenshot of their first 
page of results. This search produced web pages very similar to the small reproduction in Box 
Figure 1-1. In all pages that included images (21/23; like the one at the upper right in Box Figure 
1-1), the first and most prominent image shows the 6 so-called “basic” facial expressions of 
emotion; in several search samples this was the only image produced. In all searches that 
included the box “People also ask” (7/23), the first item listed was “What are the 6 universally 
accepted facial expressions?” 
In 22/23 searches, the very first hit, titled “Reading facial expressions of emotion,” 
brought up an APA article (https://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2011/05/facial-
expressions.aspx) that led with a section on the universality of facial expressions; Figure 1 in that 
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article is a picture of the facial configurations that are hypothesized to express anger, disgust, 
fear, happiness, sadness, surprise and contempt categories and the APA article concludes with 
“Because facial expressions of emotion are part of our evolutionary history and are a biologically 
innate ability, we all have the ability to read them.” The second common hit (15/23; this and 
subsequent hits get truncated because not all searches had screens that permitted a long list) was 
to a website (https://thoughtcatalog.com/january-nelson/2018/06/list-of-emotions/) that lists the 6 
emotion categories together with their presumed universal facial expressions (the source of the 
most common image retrieved by the search). The next most common hit in the list (14/23, 
usually third or fourth entry) was a 2018 news from Science Daily titled, “How emotions in 
facial expressions are understood.” It mentions by name only the following emotion categories: 
fear, happiness, surprise, anger, sadness. It covers a research paper that was described as 
showing participants “images of faces expressing the six emotions and one neutral expression”. 
The next most common hit was typically a research paper; in our sample it was 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5152920/ (10/23 hits) which is an article 
investigating emotion perception in photographs of facial poses that are the presumed 
expressions of the six “basic” emotion categories. Another common research article was 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2852199/, whose very first sentence in the 
abstract is, “Emotional faces communicate both the emotional state and behavioral intentions of 
an individual.”  
These searches are complemented by the Wikipedia entry for “facial expressions,” as it 
appeared at the time of writing this paper, as well as by later search hits that paint a more 
nuanced picture and nearly always explicitly note that there is considerable controversy about 
how reliably we can judge emotion from faces, which categories of emotional expression have 
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actually been documented with empirical evidence, and whether emotional facial expressions are 
culturally universal.  
Our conclusion from this Google search is twofold. First, there is overwhelming evidence 
that the modal view on the internet, in evidence with a casual search, represents the common 
view of emotional expressions: that certain emotion categories (usually about 6) are reliably 
expressed with a unique and specific configuration of facial movements (i.e., it’s facial 
expression), and that these expressions can be reliably detected and serve as a valid indicator of a 
person’s emotional state. Second, closer scrutiny notes that the common view has strong 
critiques. These two observations motivated our article and our goal to produce a thorough 
review of the scientific evidence on the topic of facial expressions of emotion. 
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Box Figure 1-1. Screenshot of the first page of a Google search for “emotional facial expressions.” 
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Box 2: Theoretical Frameworks and Their Relation to Emotion Categories 
Any instance of emotion can be described using a variety of features: physical features 
(such as patterns of expressive facial movements, vocal acoustics, autonomic nervous system 
changes, and neural activity), affective features that capture what the instance feels like (e.g., 
how pleasant or unpleasant the episode feels, how arousing it feels; Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 
2009; Russell & Barrett, 1999), appraisal features that refer to how the situation is experienced 
(e.g., whether the situation is experienced as novel or familiar, as conducive to one’s immediate 
goals or not, and so on; Barrett, Mesquita et al., 2007; Clore & Ortony, 2008, 2013; Scherer et 
al., 2017) and functional features that refer to the goals that a person is attempting to meet (e.g., 
to avoid a predator, to get closer to someone, to win a competition, etc.; e.g., Adolphs, 2017; 
Lazarus, 1991). An emotion category is a grouping of emotional episodes that share a feature or 
set of features in common. In some scientific views, the probability structure describing the 
shared features is relatively stable across situations and contexts.  In other views, the similarities 
shift by context and situation.  As a consequence, many debates about the nature of emotion boil 
down to disagreements about the nature of the similarities shared by instances of the same 
emotion category and the degree of variation in the relevant features, as well as potential 
similarity and differences in features across emotion categories. These debates are summarized 
by two dimensions, as depicted in Figure 1 within the main article. The horizontal dimension 
represents hypotheses about the surface similarities across instances of the same emotion 
category, such as being expressed by similar patterns of facial movements. The vertical 
dimension represents hypotheses about the deep similarities across instances of the same emotion 
category, such as being caused by the same neural circuitry.  
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Similarities and Variation in Surface Features 
In this paper, we are primarily concerned with the horizontal dimension representing the 
similarity and variation in surface features, such as the facial movements that express instances 
of emotion. At one end of the “surface” continuum, basic emotion approaches (e.g., Ekman, 
1972; Tracy & Randles, 2011) and the discrete emotion approach (e.g., Izard, 2007, 2010; Izard, 
Woodburn & Finlon, 2010), in their original form, propose that anger, sadness, fear, disgust, 
happiness and surprise are each spontaneously expressed with a universal configuration of 
unique facial movements (as depicted in Figure 4 of the main article). These approaches 
acknowledge that people show some variation in the facial movements they make to express the 
instances of a given emotion category, but this variation is hypothesized to result from processes 
that are external to those that caused the emotional instance, such as display rules, cultural 
learning, emotion regulation, and so on. Therefore, in these views, instances within the same 
emotion category are expected to be relatively similar in their expressions (high reliability) 
across contexts, people and time, and instances of different emotion categories are expected to be 
relatively unique in their expressions (high specificity).  
Updated basic emotion approaches allow for more variation in expressions within a 
category, assuming that instances of an emotion category vary around one supposed “best 
instance” (the prototype) that is either most typical or most frequent in nature.1 Nonetheless, each 
instance of an emotion category is hypothesized to share enough of a characteristic facial 
expression that is consistently present and recognizably different from the patterns found in other 
emotion categories (for specific quotations, see Cordaro et al., 2018; Ekman, 1992, p. 550; 
Ekman & Cordaro, 2001, p. 364; Levenson, 2011, p. 379; Scarantino & Griffiths, pp. 448-449).  
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Intermediate along the horizontal dimension is the component process model of emotion 
which proposes that sequences of evaluations, referred to as appraisal checks (not to be confused 
with appraisals as descriptive features of experience; Gross & Barrett, 2011), drive the dynamics 
of facial movements that express emotion (Scherer, Mortillaro & Mehu, 2017; Scherer et al., 
2018). This approach belongs to a collection of appraisal approaches that are referred to as 
causal because they characterize appraisals as more than descriptive features of an emotional 
instance – they are thought to be actual cognitive mechanisms that produce instances of emotion, 
including the cause of how a situation is experienced and the cause of hypothesized facial 
movements that are thought to be components of the emotional instance. Causal appraisal 
approaches acknowledge the possibility that, in principle, different temporally extended patterns 
of appraisals can cause instances of the same emotion category and is therefore consistent with a 
larger variety of facial configurations that can express that emotion category (for discussion, see 
Barrett, 2017c; Gross & Barrett, 2011; Scherer et al., 2017). In practice, however, this possible 
variation remains largely unexplored in published scientific experiments. 
At the other end of the horizontal continuum are approaches that explicitly predict 
substantial, situated variation in the expressions of different instances of the same emotion as 
well as similarity in expressive forms between categories, depending on context; e.g., the theory 
of constructed emotion (Barrett, 2012, 2013, 2017a, b); core affect theory (Russell, 2003); 
functional approaches to emotion (relevant references, see Adolphs, 2017; Adolphs & Anderson, 
2018; Campos et al., 1994); and descriptive appraisal approaches (e.g., Clore & Ortony, 2013; 
for a discussion, see Barrett, 2017c; Gross & Barrett, 2011). The scientific approaches predict, in 
advance, that instances of the same emotion category are expressed with highly variable facial 
configurations (a specific configuration of facial movements, like those in Figure 4 in the main 
article are predicted to have low reliability as emotional expressions across people, situations and 
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cultures); in addition, instances of different emotion categories or even non-emotion categories 
may be similar in their expressive configurations (a given set of facial movements have low 
specificity as expressions of a single emotion category), depending on the context.  Notice that 
these approaches are not predicting some expressive variation, but a lot of expressive variation.  
Moreover, context is not considered a process that moderates or modifies an underlying universal 
expressive process, but rather is hypothesized to be intrinsic and meaningful (i.e., functional) for 
the expressive variation observed. For example, the theory of constructed emotion proposes that 
facial expressions of emotion are intrinsically constructed in a context-dependent way that has 
been learned and wired into the brain in a particular culture.  
Similarities and Differences in Deep Features 
At the top of the “deep” continuum, basic emotion approaches propose that anger, 
sadness, fear, disgust, happiness and surprise categories are each caused by their own set of 
dedicated neural circuits (Tracy & Randles, 2011), a hypothetical affect program (Ekman & 
Cordaro, 2011), or a set of emotion-specific computations (Bach & Dayan, 2017). Some 
scientific approaches allow for considerable variation in the physical causes of emotion and 
instead propose that each category shares a universal, functional similarity across situations (e.g., 
fear is the desire to escape from a predator; Adolphs, 2017; Anderson & Adolphs, 2018; Campos 
et al., 1994). At the bottom end of the continuum are theoretical approaches which hypothesize 
that an emotion category does not exist in the brain as a fixed neural circuit, a fixed computation, 
or a fixed function. Instead, the human brain is thought to engage in dynamic category 
construction, assembling a category of emotion representations on the fly, related to a situation-
specific goal, using past experience.  This ad hoc category is also described as an ad hoc concept 
(Barrett, 2017a, b). This type of ad hoc category is called a goal-based category, because the 
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similarity of its instances is based on the goal that the instances serve in a particular situation at a 
particular moment in time (Barsalou, 1983, 1985; Barsalou et al., 2003). 
Importantly, the entire vertical dimension of theoretical approaches explicitly anchor their 
hypotheses in evolutionary considerations, so it is misleading to refer to any one approach as the 
evolutionary approach. Most assume that emotion categories are psychological as well as 
biological categories. And both draw inspiration from Charles Darwin (albeit from different 
books, making very different assumptions about the nature of biological categories; for 
discussion, see Barrett 2017a, b). 
Emotion Concepts 
An emotion concept is a mental representation of an emotion category. Theoretical 
hypotheses about the proposed degree of variation in surface and deep features of an emotion 
category strongly relate to the proposed nature of emotion categories and their relation to 
emotion concepts. Approaches that hypothesize strong reliability and specificity in emotional 
expressions and other physical features shared by the instances of an emotion category, along 
with a deep causal similarity, propose that emotion categories are natural kind or Aristotelian 
categories (the red zone in Figure 1); correspondingly, instances of different categories can be 
distinguished by observing their physical features, like the facial movements expressing emotion. 
If an emotion category has a classical structure, then its corresponding concept reads like a 
dictionary definition that is stored in memory, describing its necessary and sufficient features. 
A variety of theoretical approaches propose that emotional instances are structured 
prototype categories (the yellow zone in Figure 1). A prototype category has instances that share 
some graded, family resemblance in their features. Of all the features that might describe the 
category, each instance might contain only a sample of features (resulting is more within-
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category variation and more between-category similarity than is true for Aristotelian categories). 
The corresponding emotion concept (its prototype) might be the most frequent instance found in 
the category, or its most typical instance (i.e., it is the instance that has all or most of the 
category’s distinguishing features). Or the prototype might be a theory that describes the most 
typical instance (e.g., Clore & Ortony, 1991). Either way, the assumption is that there is a single 
probability structure for the features of the category across situations and contexts (i.e., the 
prototype does not change with context). The hypothesis that emotion categories are structured 
as prototypes is consistent with a variety of theoretical approaches in the science of emotion, 
including basic emotion approaches (e.g., Cowen & Keltner, 2017; Ekman & Cordaro, 2011), 
appraisal approaches (e.g., Shaver et al., 1987), a psychological construction approach (e.g., 
Russell, 2003) and functional approaches (e.g., Campos et al., 1994; Campos, Campos & Barrett, 
1989). The assumption, however, is that there is a single set of features – a single prototype – 
that best describes each category across all contexts. 
More recently, it has been proposed that emotion categories are goal-based, conceptual 
categories (green zone, Figure 1). The instances of a given emotion category are thought to share 
a common set of features within a specific situation, but these features (including the goal or 
function of the category) can change from situation to situation (Barrett, 2006, 2012, 2013, 
2017a, b; Barrett, Wilson-Mendenhall, & Barsalou, 2015; LeBois et al., 2018; Wilson-
Mendenhall et al., 2011). The hypothesis is that emotion categories, like all abstract categories, 
do not have conceptual cores (Barrett, Wilson-Mendenhall, & Barsalou, 2015; Wilson-
Mendenhall et al., 2011), meaning that emotion concepts are constructed on the spot, as needed 
(i.e., they are ad hoc concepts). 
Unlike the typological thinking that supports classical and prototype categories, 
conceptual categories are rooted in population thinking, or the idea that a biological category is 
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populated with context-dependent, variable instances, so that any summary of the category (like 
a prototype) is an abstraction. The proposal that emotion categories are goal-based, conceptual 
categories, derives from Darwin’s use of population thinking in On the Origin of Species 
(1859/1964; see Mayr, 2004), as well as Barsalou’s research on grounded concepts (Barsalou, 
1983, 1985, 2008; Barsalou et al., 2003), where the prototype of a category is context-dependent, 
and represents the ideal instance that best suits the function or goal in a specific situation, 
whether or not it actually exists in nature (e.g., Barsalou, 1983; Voorspoels, Vanpaemel, & 
Storms, 2011). Correspondingly, the hypothesis is that the similarity in an emotion category is 
not fixed or static – it varies from situation to situation because the similarity of its instances is 
based on the goal that the instances serve in a particular situation at a particular moment in time. 
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Box 3: The Current Study of Context Effects in Emotion Perception 
There is growing evidence that both the facial movements that express emotions and the 
emotional meaning inferred for those movements are strongly influenced by the contexts in 
which they occur. In the scientific study of how people infer emotions from the facial 
movements of other people (i.e., studies of emotion perception), three types of context have been 
increasingly studied: situationally-based context, in which a face is physically presented with 
other sensory input that has some informational value, such as a body posture or a tone of voice; 
person-based context, in which the processes inside the brain or body of the perceiver is 
influencing the inferred emotional meaning in facial movements of other people; and broader 
cultural contexts (for summaries, see Aviezer & Hassin, 2017; Barrett, Mesquita, & Gendron, 
2011; de Gelder, 2016; Gendron, Mesquita & Barrett, 2013; Hess & Hareli, 2017; Wieser & 
Brosch, 2012).1 In the majority of studies, contextual cues dominate the inferences that 
perceivers make when viewing the facial movements of other people, such that the emotional 
meaning of face is interpreted in line with its context, rather than its hypothesized emotional 
meaning as portrayed in Figure 4 of the main article (e.g., Aviezer et al., 2008, 2012; van den 
Stock et al., 2007; Wallbott, 1988; Wood, Martin, Alibali, & Niedenthal, 2018). Studies of how 
the context influence the activation of facial muscle movements are less frequent, but still exist 
(but for several clever examples, see Fernandez-Dols & Ruiz-Belda, 1997; Fridlund, 1991; Ruiz-
Belda et al., 2003). Nonetheless, when context is properly acknowledged and assessed, scientific 
findings run contrary to the notion that there is a privileged set of facial muscle configurations 
that universally express emotions in a way that allows a reliable and specific reverse inference to 
be made about a person’s emotional state. Instead, the scientific evidence is more consistent with 
                                                 
1 Gendron et al. (2013) was first written and submitted for publication in 2010. 
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functionalist, constructionist and behavioral ecology approaches to understanding the nature 
emotion (Box 2). These approaches are also more consistent with the empirical evidence in other 
domains of perception, which show that contextual variation is intrinsically involved in the most 
basic aspects of movement and object perception.  
The classic demonstration of how context impacts the interpretation of facial movements 
is the Kuleshov effect. In the early 20th century, the Soviet filmmaker Lev Kuleshov 
demonstrated that that the emotional meaning of an actor’s neutral face changes depending on 
what was viewed immediately before: videos designed to evoke pleasantness (a little girl playing 
with a doll) or lust (a woman on a divan), unpleasantness (a dead woman in a coffin), and hungry 
(a bowl of soup) (Barratt et al., 2016; Mobbs et al., 2006; see Calbi et al., 2017 for a recent study 
as well as older references). These findings are echoed in more recent studies by the US 
psychologist Jim Russell and may explain the recent emergence in social media of “resting bitch 
face” and “backpfeifengesicht” (literally, a face in need of a punch). 
The vast majority of published studies ask participants to pose an emotional expression in 
the absence of context (or in a singular, impoverished; e.g., Cordaro et al., 2018) or to infer 
emotion in a facial configuration that is absent any contextual cues except those that are provided 
(by the experimental task intentionally or not). In doing so, scientists are typically taking a 
reductionist approach to discover the emotional meaning of facial movements. Participants may 
instead be communicating a culturally established expectation, stereotype, or meme that may or 
may not hold in everyday contexts that are richer in the multimodal information that they carry. 
Humans focus their attention on one another’s faces when they communicate, but this is not 
evidence that emotional information is carried solely, or even primarily, in the face alone 
(Aviezer et al., 2012). In real life, faces don’t appear in isolation. Instead, they appear in rich, 
dynamic multi-sensory, temporally-extended contexts (i.e., scenes or events) that includes a 
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body, a broader situational arrangement, and often a voice, smells, and so on. These additional 
sources of information are only considered “context” when the starting assumption is that the 
face is primary in communication emotion. In our view, this “context” in all its forms must be 
explicitly measured and modeled to achieve an ethology of emotional communication in the 
wild. 
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Box 4: The Origin of the Proposed Facial Expressions 
The belief that certain configurations of facial movements uniquely express certain 
emotion categories and therefore can be used to infer a person’s inner state of mind reached 
prominence in the paintings by Rembrandt in the 17th century. Different sets of universal 
expressive forms were proposed by various artists, such as in the drawings of Charles Le Brun, 
the 17th century French painter for King Louis XIV of France (Montagu, 1994), in the facial 
movements found in Hindu Navarasa dance 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1uIan6u3UrQ), in the heads depicted by the 18th century 
German sculptor Franz Xaver Messerschmidt (https://www.pinterest.com/tkearneyg/franz-
xaver-messerschmidt/), in moving photographs by the 19th century Czech neuroscientist Jan 
Evangelista Purkinje (Wade, 2016), in the prescriptions of the 19th century French dramatist 
François Delsarte (Stebbins & Delsarte, 1887/2013), and in the photographs taken by the French 
physician Guillaume-Benjamin-Amand Duchenne, which were highlighted in the writings of 
Charles Darwin (Darwin, 1872). These varying proposals were united by the assumption that 
certain emotion categories were each expressed by one unique facial configuration, making it 
possible to infer one (emotional state) from the other (the configuration of facial movements). 
How did the science of emotion end up focusing almost exclusively on the facial 
configurations displayed in Figure 4 of the main article? The story of their origin has been 
discussed in Ekman, Friesen & Ellsworth (1972), Gendron & Barrett (2017) and Russell (1994). 
Darwin did not discover the facial configurations through careful observation in the same way 
that such observations led him to discover natural selection. Instead, he stipulated those 
configurations based on drawings by Bell (1806) and photographs by Duchenne (1990/1862), 
continuing the tradition of others who, before him, stipulated other facial movements as the 
expressions of emotions.  
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Darwin conducted two informal studies of emotional expressions. In The Expression of 
the Emotions in Man and Animals, he described an informal survey to test his hypothesis that 
certain facial movements expressed emotions in a way that is shared with other animal species 
and therefore in a universal way around the world. He provided his colleagues with verbal 
descriptions of specific expressive forms along with the emotion category he thought they 
expressed, and he asked his colleagues (living in various parts of the world) whether they 
believed his hypotheses were true. Darwin also conducted a second informal study that he 
described in a letter to a colleague, in which he presented 24 participants with 11 static 
photographs of facial configurations elicited by electrical stimulation of facial muscles (detailed 
in Snyder, Kaufman, Harrison, & Maruff, 2010). These photographs were taken by Duchenne, 
who believed that facial muscles produce expressions that reveal a person’s inner state. 
Duchenne created over 60 photographs of facial configurations that are often referred to as 
“induced emotional expressions,” but actually the photographs capture exaggerated facial muscle 
contractions elicited by external electrical stimulation. Darwin’s description of the study suggests 
he asked his participants to freely describe the emotion presenting in each photo (i.e., he used a 
free-labeling response method).  
Research that proceeded in the early 20th century attempted to replicate and extend 
Darwin’s second study using photographs of faces posed in exaggerated configurations. Others 
went about the task of detailing the specific facial movements that constitute the configurations 
that were believed to be emotional expressions. Few research studies actually tested whether 
emotional expressions made in everyday life actually conform to these portrayals. The emotion 
perception studies that were conducted and published during this period generally showed that 
perceivers were highly variable in the in the emotional causes they inferred for each 
configuration, with little reliability and specificity. This larger body of research gave rise to a 
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scientific era that was guided by the hypothesis emotions and their expressions were socially 
constructed and culturally variable.  
The one exception was studies using a choice-from-array approach involving brief 
vignettes describing each emotion category, referred to as the Dashiell (1927) method. This 
method was known to provide stronger support for Darwin’s hypotheses or other hypotheses of 
universality inspired by Darwin.  In the early 1960’s the U.S. psychologist Paul Ekman and his 
colleagues resurrected a research paradigm to test Darwin’s original ideas about emotional 
expressions, largely relying on choice-from-array methods. They took a large set of photographs 
developed by Sylvan Tomkins, in which actors posed what they believed to be the expression of 
anger, contempt, disgust, fear, happiness, interest, sadness, shame and surprise categories. 
Participants viewed the candidate poses and along with a small set of emotion words and set 
about the task of choosing the word that best matched each pose. Based on participants’ 
reliability in choosing the expected emotion word to label each photo, a final set of photos was 
chosen. The focus on six categories -- anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise was 
therefore accidental, not based on theoretical considerations – portrayals of contempt, interest 
and shame expressions were not labeled reliably and so were not initially studied. Ekman and 
colleagues also incorporated work by the Swedish anatomist Carl-Herman Hjortsjö, who 
catalogued Duchenne’s facial configurations and stipulated them to be emotional expressions 
(Hjortsjö, 1969).  
This is the origin of the facial configurations in Figure 4, which are used in the majority 
of experiments of emotion perception and that correspondingly constitute common beliefs about 
how certain emotion categories are typically expressed. Many different sets of facial poses have 
been developed over the years, a selection of which can be found here: 
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https://rystoli.github.io/FSTC.html 
http://cbcsl.ece.ohio-state.edu/downloads.html 
http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~gary/CAFE/ 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8013713/  
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Box 5: The Face: Anatomy of Facial Muscles and Facial Electromyography 
The Anatomy of Facial Muscles 
To understand how people move their facial muscles into certain patterns of movements, 
it’s helpful to consider how facial muscles develop and are structured. Healthy humans have a 
common set of 17 facial muscles on each side of the face that contract and relax in patterns 
(Rinn, 1984) 2. Facial muscles develop in utero. By 36 weeks, almost all of the muscles used to 
produce facial movements are formed (Gasser, 1967), although their morphology is not identical 
to an adult human. The muscles are controlled by cranial nerves V and VII which become 
functional a bit earlier, by 11 weeks in utero (Reissland et al., 2011). Facial muscle movements 
support many functions, such as sucking movements necessary for feeding and tongue 
movements necessary for speech (Haywood & Getchell, 2014). As a consequence, the 
development of facial muscles influences how emotions are expressed on the face.  
To create facial movements that are visible to the naked eye, facial muscles contract, 
moving skin into folds and wrinkles on an underlying skeletal structure. These are the 
movements people observe in one another, that are captured in photographs and videos, and that 
express emotions. These visible facial articulations are called Action Units (AUs). Clear and 
consistent data are currently not available to indicate when facial expressions are first formed. 
While fetuses in utero definitely make some facial movements, it is entirely unknown if these 
have anything to do with emotion-like states. Some scientists claim that young infants produce 
facial movements to pain that resemble those of adults (Izard et al., 1987), even though the 
underlying anatomy is not morphologically identical (Camras & Shutter, 2010).  
                                                 
2 There are somewhat different numbers often given, because a single muscle may comprise more than one 
functional unit. 
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Individual differences in facial anatomy, as well as in the brain’s control of facial 
muscles, cause variation in the details of how facial movements are executed at the muscular 
level and how they look to the naked eye. People vary in the underlying bone structure of the 
face and details of the skin, the structure and strength of their facial muscles (Pessa et al., 1988), 
the dynamics of facial muscle movements, and consequently they vary in how their facial 
movements look to a human observer (e.g., Farahvash et al., 2010; Shim et al., 2008; Shimada & 
Gasser, 1989). In addition, some people have strong asymmetries for one side of the face or the 
other, and some people lack certain smaller muscles altogether (Waller, 2008). In fact, if you 
inserted your exact facial muscles into a different face (someone with a different bone structure 
or someone much older or younger than you, or whose face is thinner or fatter), the resulting 
muscle movements would look different than they do on your face. And even when facial 
movements look the same to the naked eye, there may be differences in their execution under the 
skin. As human perceivers, we see stable facial behaviors (i.e., a frown) when in reality, under 
the skin, there is more variation that meets the eye. A facial behavior, like frowning, or scowling, 
is, in fact, a category of variable instances. When you watch a frown unfold in the same person 
on two different occasions, the exact muscle contractions that curl the upper lip and turn down 
the corners of the mouth can subtly vary from one instance to another. What to the naked eye 
looks like the same frown in two different people can result from different patterns of underlying 
muscle contractions.  
Put simply: something as seemingly simple as a single facial movement is best 
understood as a conceptual category, resulting from a variable set of more basic, variable 
physical changes. The same is true for all motor movements, for smells and for sounds. For 
example, the sound of a “b” is acoustically different when heard in the words “bad” and “bed”, 
yet human brains wire themselves to hear both as the sound of “b” (i.e., the sound of a “b” is a 
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category; Barsalou 1992).  
 
Box Figure 5-1. The muscles of the face.  
Measuring Facial Movements with Facial Electromyography (fEMG) 
The most sensitive and direct way to measure facial muscle movements is to record the 
electrical activity of facial muscles as they contract. This is called facial electromyography, or 
facial EMG, and is done by placing electrodes in or on the muscles of the face. Actually inserting 
thin electrodes into the muscles provides the most sensitive and specific electrical recordings, but 
this approach is rarely used since it is more invasive. It is more common to use surface 
recordings from electrodes placed on the skin that measure the changes in electrical potential of 
muscle depolarization. EMG recordings of facial muscle movements were first made in the late 
1950s and were later used for studying emotion and affect in the 1970s (Tassinary et al., 2007). 
The specificity with which individual muscles can be distinguished from one another depends on 
how many electrodes are put on the face. Typically, only three to six electrodes are put on the 
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face, although many more than that can be uncomfortable for a test subject. This means that 
many facial muscle movements are not measured in most studies that use facial EMG. Current 
research suggests that specific patterns of facial EMG activity reliably distinguish between 
pleasant vs. unpleasant states, as well as the intensity of the states along with how social the 
situation is, but that they do not reliably distinguish between different individual categories of 
emotion (Cacioppo et al., 2000).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box Figure 5-2. Measuring facial electromyography (fEMG). Left: Common electrode locations, showing some of the facial muscles 
whose activity they can measure. VII indicates that all the muscles are controlled by the facial nerve (7th cranial nerve). Right: example 
of a recorded EMG signal. The trace plots the absolute value of the change in electrical activity (in microvolts) versus time (in seconds). 
See Figure 4 for a summary of how combinations of these muscles contribute to facial action units in FACS coding. Left image 
reproduced, with permission, from Van Boxtel, A. (2010, August). Facial EMG as a tool for inferring affective states. In A. J. Spink, F. 
Grieco, O. E. Krips, L. W. S. Loijens, L. P. J. J. Noldus, & P. H. Zimmerman (Eds.), Proceedings of Measuring Behavior 2010. 
Retrieved from http://measuringbehavior.org/files/ProceedingsPDF(website)/Boxtel_Symposium6.4.pdf.  
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Box 6: A Summary of Computer Vision Algorithms for 
Automatically Detecting Facial Actions 
The goal of computer vision algorithms is to identify a functional mapping between two 
variables x and y, where x is the image of a face and y the list of active action units (AUs) 
observed in the face in x, i.e., AUs=f(face image). There are two main solutions to the problem 
of identifying f(.). One is to manually derive functions that we believe do a good job at 
identifying AUs in images. The other approach is to learn f(.) from the data – from pairs of 
samples x and y. This second approach is called machine learning.  
Manually-Derived Functions 
There are three types of manually-derived functions for solving AUs=f(face image). 
1. Optical flow: Optical flow is the apparent motion of landmark points on an object, such as a 
face (Kroeger et al., 2016), e.g., how does the landmark point defining the left corner of the 
mouth appear to move when we activate AU 12 (lip corner puller). A dense optical flow 
approach is when most of the pixels defining a face are landmark points. A computer vision 
algorithm can use dense optical flow to identify AUs on a face by computing the apparent 
movement of a set of facial landmark points between a generic neutral face and the given 
image (Donato et al., 1999; Yacoob & Davis, 1996; Martinez, 2003). One way to improve 
the performance of this algorithm is to use a person-specific approach, where the neutral face 
used to compute the optical flow is an image of the same individual as that in the image we 
need to analyze. Advantages: This approach generally worked well in lab conditions (>80%) 
and where the face is seen frontally and is not occluded. The algorithm’s performance 
improves (>90%) when we use a person-specific approach. Disadvantages: Both a person’s 
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neutral face (at rest) and the image of the apex of a facial configuration must first be known. 
Detection of the apex is a problem that has received scarce attention in computer vision. 
This, combined with the need for non-occluded, frontal images, has limited the use of this 
approach to images filmed in controlled, lab conditions. The method is also limited to people 
for whom we have a neutral face available or one can be detected in a video sequence.  
2. Linear filters: Another solution is to use a linear filter h(.). A linear filter (such as a Gabor 
filter) is a functional mapping that acts locally on an image and has linear constraints. The 
functional mapping is given by a convolution of the image with the filter h(.). A convolution 
can be intuitively understood as the multiplication of the pixels of the filter with a local patch 
of the image of the same size as the filter, with this multiplication being applied to every 
possible placing of the filter on the image. The response of these local multiplications is 
generally different when the AU is active in a face than when it is not. Because of this, local 
filters have been extensively used to identify AUs in images of faces (Benitez-Quiroz et al., 
2016; De la Torre & Cohn, 2011; Liu & Wechsler, 2002; Lyons et al., 1999; Tian et al., 
2002). Advantages: Convolutions are fast operators. This makes for fast (i.e., processing at 
>30 frames per second) and accurate algorithms (>90%) detection of AUs in images filmed 
in the lab as well as in the wild. To date, this is one of the most successful approaches to 
identifying some (but not all) AUs (Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2017a). Disadvantages: Local 
filters only work when the texture in the patch of the image is well defined. When the local 
patch is smooth (e.g., middle of the cheeks), the response of a filter is similar for active 
versus inactive AUs. 
3. Shape descriptors: The shape of an object is defined as the geometric properties of the object 
when all information related to the object’s position, scale and rotation have been eliminated 
(Hamsici & Martinez, 2009). Shape is especially useful to define AUs that deform major 
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components of the face, e.g., the lips, eyelids, eyebrows, nose, and jaw line. Shape can also 
be used to define the wrinkles seen in the forehead when activating AUs 1 (inner brow raiser) 
and 2 (outer brow raiser) as well as those around the nose caused by AUs 9 (nose wrinkler) 
and 10 (upper lid raiser). These descriptors have been successfully used to detect these and 
other AUs in images filmed in the lab and in the wild (Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2016; Martinez 
& Du, 2012; Neth & Martinez, 2010; Kotsia et al., 2008). Advantages: Works in local 
patches with little texture and contrast. Can be applied to low-resolution images and under 
varying pose. Disadvantages: Not all image changes caused by AUs define an easily 
detectable shape change, e.g., AUs 11 (nasolabial deepener) and 14 (dimpler). 
Machine Learning-Derived Functions 
There are two types of machine-learning functions for solving AUs=f(face image). 
1. Probabilistic algorithms: Statistical learning theory and statistical pattern recognition are 
algorithms that learn from sample pairs: S={(x1,y1),…,(xn,yn)}, where yi=f(xi), and f(.) is 
generally a probability density function (pdf) or a mixture of pdfs (McLachlan & Peel, 
2004). Intuitively, a pdf is a function that give the relative likelihood of a value of x i to 
belong to a value of yi. Given the training set S, we can estimate these likelihoods and, 
hence, the pdf. This approach works best when combined with the computer vision 
features defined above (optical flow, linear filters, and shape) (Benitez-Quiroz et al., 
2016; Zafeiriou et al., 2016; Corneanu et al., 2016). Advantages: To date this is the most 
successful approach to the recognition of AUs in the lab and in the wild (Benitez-Quiroz 
et al., 2016, 2017a, 2018). Disadvantages: The training set S needs to include images 
under a variety of image conditions (illumination, pose) as well as people of diverse 
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ethnicities, races and skin colors. The lack of diversity in these datasets has resulted in 
technology that is based to minorities (Buolamwini, 2018). 
2. Deep learning: An alternative to the above approach is to learn the function f(.) using 
regression analysis. Regression analysis identifies relationships between predictor 
variables and dependent variables, much like probabilistic algorithms. The difference 
here is that we need not use a probabilistic model (Belkin & Niyogi, 2003). Rather, we 
assume the functional mapping provides a direct relationship between x and y (see, for 
example, Martinez, 2017a, for some examples). In this approach, the goal is to estimate 
the parameters of the manifold (function). If the function is linear, we can use linear 
least-squares. If the function is non-linear (which is typically the case), we need to use a 
non-linear optimization approach. One famous solution is gradient descent (Rumelhart et 
al., 1988). Additionally, when the number of parameters to be estimated is very large, this 
approach is called deep learning. Deep learning has been extremely successful in many 
computer vision applications. Missing from the list of successful applications, however, 
is the recognition of AUs. The reason for this is simple: to estimate a very large number 
of parameters in f(.), we require an equally large number of sample pairs (xi,yi), i=1,…,n, 
with n large. As we discussed in the paper though, manually annotating a large number of 
images (xi) with their corresponding AUs (yi) would require years and millions of dollars 
to complete. A solution that is being attempted is to use automatic annotations instead 
(Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2017b; Zhao et al., 2016b). That is, we can use current algorithms 
to automatically annotate AUs in a large number of images. One then uses these 
annotations to train a deep learning algorithm that is robust to errors in the training data. 
We are awaiting additional experiments to determine if this approach will succeed. One 
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solution may be to use deep learning to generate realistically-looking samples, typically 
called deep fakes. A recent paper (Pumarola et al., 2018) shows this should be possible.  
Improving Automatic Annotations  
Researchers in computer vision are studying ways of improving the performance of 
current algorithms to map facial movements to AU codes (Corneanu et al., 2016). One promising 
approach identifies dependencies in facial movements (Zhao et al., 2016). Facial movements 
typically do not occur in isolation. Try this: Face a mirror and try to move the outer corners of 
your eyebrows (AU2) while keeping every other facial muscle at rest. You will notice this is a 
difficult task. Algorithms can learn these dependencies to improve the automatic annotation of 
AUs of any of the algorithms described above (Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2017b). For example, if we 
uncover that AUs 1 and 2 are co-articulated quite often and that AU 1 almost never co-occurs 
with AU 23, we can use this knowledge to improve the annotations of AU 1 once we know 
whether a face has AU 2 and/or 23 active. Box Figure 1-1 shows the dependencies obtained on a 
small set of posed facial configurations taken in controlled, lab conditions. Learning AU 
dependencies is important to understand the evolution of AU production from birth to adulthood. 
For example, if these dependencies are small in babies and large in adults, it suggests a learning 
or developmental process in the production of facial configurations; no changes may indicate an 
innate system that is anatomically constrained and possibly available at birth. In addition, if these 
dependencies vary across cultures, it would point to a cultural influence in the malleability of 
facial movements; no cultural variation would suggest that there are universal (possibly 
anatomical or neural) constraints on the facial configurations that a human face can produce. 
These hypotheses about AU dependencies await future research.  
Research to Validate Automated Coding of AUs Relies on Supervised Learning  
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For the above algorithms to work, we need the training set S defined above. That is, we 
need a set of images whose AUs have been coded by an expert FACS coder (i.e., the images are 
manually annotated). Many databases have been collected of posed and spontaneous facial 
configurations in lab conditions (for example, see Lucey et al., 2010; Mavadati et al., 2013). 
These databases typically have between a few to several hundred training images. Recently, a 
large database of facial expressions in the wild was collected and made available to researchers 
(Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2016). This large dataset was used in the EmotioNet Challenge3 (Benitez-
Quiroz et al., 2017a), as discussed in the paper. To evaluate the accuracy of AU annotation of 
these computer vision algorithms, part of the dataset is used for training an algorithm and an 
independent set of images is used for testing the accuracy of the algorithm. Accuracy of 
annotations as well as true and false positive and true and false negative are usually reported. 
Temporal Information 
Temporal features have also been used to identify AUs (Bartlett et al., 2014). 
Unfortunately, these algorithms are not based on a natural model of facial movement dynamics 
(Cohn & Schmidt, 2004; Zuckerman et al., 1976). Instead, these algorithms attempt to identify 
correlations between temporal image features with the presence of AUs. Ideally, we would like 
to have algorithms that use the same temporal features employed by humans. Unfortunately, 
these temporal features are, for the most part, unknown at present. Hence, there is a need to 
better understand the dynamics of facial movements and how these dynamics aid detection and 
contribute to their inferred psychological meaning. This is an area of future research for both 
psychologists and computer scientists.  
 
 
                                                 
3 http://cbcsl.ece.ohio-state.edu/EmotionNetChallenge/index.html 
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Box Figure 6-1. Co-articulation of action units. Positive correlations (red) and negative correlations (yellow) 
between facial actions, estimated from a set of 350,000 frames of facial movements. This approach uses 
dependencies to predict the presence or absence of AUs before they are detected, improving the accuracy of the 
algorithms to detect facial movements and map them to AUs (Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2017b). These algorithms have 
also been recently tested in less constrained conditions (i.e., in the wild; Zafeiriou et al., 2016). © 2016 IEEE. 
Reprinted, with permission, from Zhao, K., Chu, W. S., De la Torre, F., Cohn, J. F., & Zhang, H. (2016). Joint patch 
and multi-label learning for facial action unit and holistic expression recognition. IEEE Transactions on Image 
Processing, 25(8), 3931–3946. 
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Box 7: Variations in Facial Configurations 
 In principle, a human face can make a multitude of movement patterns: 16 million 
different combinations are possible, in principle, assuming each of the 24 AUs corresponding to 
muscle movements could move independently (ignoring temporal dynamics; Martinez, 2017b). 
In addition, facial muscles can contract with different intensities and varying time to peak 
contraction (Jack & Schyns, 2017), further increasing the number of movement patterns a face 
can generate, in principle. In practice, however, a much smaller subset of combinations is likely 
because of the way that brain controls the face as well as various anatomical constraints (e.g., 
some muscles are more or less likely to move together because of their relative position to one 
another, how they are attached to facial bones, or how they are innervated by nerves).   
Several obstacles make it challenging to scientifically observe which configurations are 
made by healthy people and with what frequency. The most serious obstacle is one of naming: 
many published studies equate facial movements with emotional expressions rather than treating 
their correspondence as a hypothesis to be tested. For example, facial AU 4, 5, 7 and 23 are 
referred to as an expression of anger rather than as a lowered brow (AU 4), raised upper lid (AU 
5), tightened lid (AU 7) and tightened lip (AU 23). This conflation is sometimes built into an 
experiment itself, particularly if FACS coding is not used (for a good example, see Calvo et al., 
2014). Some studies measure the presence or absence of facial movements with a less systematic 
coding system called the EMFACS (Emotion FACS), in which coders decide whether a pre-
specified group of AUs (i.e., the stipulated expression for each emotion category) are active en 
masse (i.e., coders identify the presence or absence of the entire configuration), rather than 
independently identify the presence or absence of each facial AU. Hence, EMFACS is less 
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reliable than the FACS 4 because it encourages coders to make mental inferences about the 
meaning of the muscle movements while they are describing the muscle movements, thereby 
conflating scientific measurements (which facial muscles moved) with their interpretation (which 
emotions were expressed).  
Approach 
To date, no research has systematically or fully cataloged the number of configurations 
that are biologically possible nor which are routinely made in the wild and with what frequency, 
but one study makes a start, and also offers a clear example of combining automated-human 
FACS coding (Srinivasan & Martinez, 2018). Over seven million images were mined from the 
internet by first identifying all the nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs, along with their 
semantic and lexical relations in the English dictionary that many people think of as emotions.5 
These words were then translated into Spanish, Mandarin Chinese, Farsi, Arabic and Russian. 
The words were then used to identify and download images of human faces using a variety of 
online search engines. The configuration of AUs in each image was automatically FACS coded 
using a computer vision algorithm (Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2016, 2017b, 2018). Human FACS 
coders then manually verified the accuracy of the results provided by the automated analysis for 
a subset of images. 
 
Facial Configurations Discovered 
                                                 
4 EMFACS identifies a prescribed set of AUs that are thought to express emotion rather than coding the presence or 
absence of each AU one at a time. Anyone who is trained to use FACS can also use EMFACS; there is no special 
training. It is important to take note of which coding is used, because EMFACS is less reliable (Rosenberg, Erika. 
Frequently Asked Questions. erikarosenberg.com/faq) and potentially more prone to bias.  
5 WordNet (Miller, 1995) defines a structure—a graph—that identifies synonyms as well as superordinate and 
subordinate concepts for each word. A subordinate is a word with a more specific meaning (e.g., despair a 
subordinate of sadness). A superordinate is a word with more general meaning (e.g., emotion is a superordinate of 
sadness). 
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Thirty-five configurations of AUs were observed as common to the images mined in all 
six languages (see Box Table 7-1). This amounts to 22% of the facial configurations that were 
identified in the seven million images (1.87% of the seven million images contained these 35 
configurations). Only eight additional facial configurations were identified that were common in 
the images mined in one or more, but not all, of these languages.6  
The results provide the very first attempt at cross-cultural assessment of facial 
configurations observed in the wild (rather than deliberately posed) and invite a variety of 
interpretations. One possibility is that these findings support the hypothesis of a small number of 
facial configurations that are available for emotional expression within and across cultures 
(although admittedly significantly larger than the six proposed configurations in Figure 4 in the 
main article, e.g., Martinez, 2017a). This interpretation is cautioned by several considerations, 
however.  
First, the scientific approach taken by Srinivasan & Martinez (2018) is likely to have 
missed some facial configurations. Current algorithms only identify 16 of the 24 possible AUs.7 
Human coders only verified the AUs detected by the algorithm, meaning that AUs that were 
actually present in the images but went undetected by the algorithm were missed entirely. More 
generally, as illustrated by the EmotioNet Challenge (http://cbcsl.ece.ohio-
state.edu/EmotionNetChallenge/), current algorithms do not have high accuracy for detecting 
facial movements in the wild. In addition, English words were used to mine for images, but the 
other languages sampled (Spanish, Mandarin Chinese, Farsi, Arabic and Russian) contain 
indigenous words for emotions that do not correspond easily to single English words (Smith, 
                                                 
6 Of these, 2 were observed in a single language, 2 in two languages, 3 in three languages and 1 in four languages.  
7 These are the most frequently observed AUs. Those AUs that are not currently detected are infrequent. 
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2016), and therefore may be associated with AU configurations that were not sampled in the first 
place. 
Second, the images used by Srinivasan & Martinez (2018) were derived from the 
internet. Internet images, while better than posed faces, do not substitute for scientific 
observations of facial movements in the real world. The internet is a curated version of reality. 
Some common facial configurations are likely missing because they are rarely uploaded to the 
internet, and some configurations commonly found on the internet may not be commonly 
observed in the real world.  
For these reasons, and also because the cultures sampled have some contact with 
practices and norms of the U.S., the Srinivasan & Martinez (2018) study does not, on its own, 
confirm that the 35 identified facial configurations are, in fact, universal. Instead, the study 
suggest that these facial configurations are commonly used to express instances of emotion 
across a number of languages in industrialized nations. Furthermore, even if future studies reveal 
that some or all of these 35 facial configurations are indeed universally made, this does not 
automatically mean that each is an innate expression with a unique emotional meaning; the 
universality of these expressions may be a result of cultural norms people learn as children (see 
Box 10). 
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Box Table 7-1: Thirty-five unique combinations of facial actions observed in cultures whose 
primary languages are English, Spanish, Mandarin Chinese, Farsi, and Russian. 
ID AUs Examples ID AUs Examples ID AUs Examples 
1 4 
 
13 4, 7, 9, 10, 
17 
 
25 1, 2, 5, 
25, 26 
 2 5 
 
14 9, 10, 15 
 
26 4, 7, 9, 
25, 26 
 3 2, 4 
 
15 12, 25 
 
27 12, 25, 
26 
 4 4, 7 
 
16 6, 12, 25 
 
28 2, 12, 
25, 26 
 
5 12 
 
17 2, 5, 12, 
25 
 
29 5, 12, 
25, 26 
 6 2, 12 
 
18 1, 2, 5, 12, 
25 
 
30 2, 5, 12, 
25, 26 
 7 5, 12 
 
19 6, 12, 25 
 
31 1, 2, 5, 
12, 25, 
26 
 
8 1, 2, 5, 
12 
 
20 10, 12, 25, 
26 
 
32 6, 12, 
25, 26 
 
9 6, 12 
 
21 1, 2, 25, 
26 
 
33 7, 9, 20, 
25, 26 
 
10 4, 15 
 
22 1, 4, 25, 
26 
 
34 1, 2, 5, 
20, 25, 
26 
 
11 1, 4, 15 
 
23 5, 25, 26 
 
35 1, 4, 5, 
20, 25, 
26 
 
12 4, 7, 17 
 
24 2, 5, 25, 
26 
 
   
Note. ID is the unique identification number given to each facial configuration. An example of each is shown. AUs 
are the active facial action units that describe each configuration. IDs 1, 2, 10, 11, and 21 were most frequently 
labeled by participants as expressions of sadness. IDs 5 through 9, 15 through 19, and 26 through 32 were most 
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frequently labeled as expressions of happiness. IDs 20 and 22 through 24 were most frequently labeled as 
expressions of surprise. IDs 4, 12, 14, 25, and 35 were most frequently labeled as expressions of anger. IDs 33 and 
34 were most frequently labeled as expressions of fear. ID 13 was most frequently labeled as an expression of 
disgust. No consistent labels were offered for ID 3. No configuration exactly matches the AU configurations 
proposed by Darwin or documented in prior research (for AU comparisons, see Cordaro et al., 2018; Ekman et al., 
1969; Matsumoto et al., 2008). © 2018 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from Srinivasan, R., & Martinez, A. M. 
(2018). Cross-cultural and cultural-specific production and perception of facial expressions of emotion in the wild. 
IEEE Transactions on Affective Computing. Advance online publication. doi:10.1109/TAFFC.2018.2887267. 
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Box 8: Meta-Analytic Evidence of Autonomic Nervous System Changes During Emotion 
There have been four statistical summaries of scientific findings (called meta-analyses) 
from experiments designed to measure autonomic nervous system (ANS) changes during 
emotional episodes (Cacioppo et al., 2000; Siegel et al., 2018; Stemmler, 2004; for a discussion, 
see Quigley & Barrett, 2014). All of them, including the most comprehensive meta-analysis 
published to date covering over 200 published experiments involving more than 20,000 
participants (Siegel et al., 2018) replicate one another, finding a similar pattern of results: ANS 
changes are neither consistent nor specific across instances for any emotion category. Combining 
different measurements into a pattern performed no better at distinguishing one emotion category 
from another than did individual ANS measures (Siegel et al., 2018). Some review articles have 
tried to make a case for the existence of emotion-specific ANS patterns (e.g., Friedman, 2010; 
Kreibig, 2010), but the meta-analyses are consistent in their findings that different emotion 
categories cannot be distinguished from one another by changes in heart rate, respiration rate, 
skin conductance, or any other measure of the autonomic nervous system, alone or in 
combination; said another way, ANS measures individually, or in combination, are neither 
consistent nor specific for different emotion categories. 
The variety in emotion-related ANS changes is consistent with the writings of William 
James (1890), with population views of emotion (Box 2) and with Darwin’s articulation of 
population thinking in On the Origin of Species (1859/2001) (for a discussion, see Barrett, 
2017a), and with the US physiologist Paul Obrist’s findings that peripheral physiological 
changes are tied to the metabolic demands associated with action (e.g., cardiosomatic coupling; 
Obrist, Webb, Sutterer, & Howard, 1970) or anticipated action (e.g., supra-metabolic activity; 
Obrist, 1981; Sterling, 2012; Turner & Carroll, 1985). Because all animals (including humans) 
behave in a variety of context-sensitive ways, for example crying, shouting, smiling, freezing 
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and laughing in anger, will instance involving a different action will also be supported by a 
distinct pattern of ANS change. In this view, ANS variation is random error or epiphenomenal to 
the nature of emotion. Substantial variation in ANS patterns within an emotion category is a 
feature that should be expected because it confers evolutionary advantage (for a discussion on 
how evolution selects for variation in emotion, see Adolphs & Anderson, 2018; Barrett, 2017a). 
The variation in emotion categories observed for ANS changes is consistent with the 
evidence for the brain basis of emotion in humans (Barrett, 2017b; Clark-Polner et al., 2016) and 
in non-human animals (for a discussion, see Adolphs & Anderson, 2018; Barrett, 2012, 2017b; 
Barrett & Satpute, 2019). For example, even studies of “fear” learning in rodents find evidence 
of variability in ANS responses and neural circuitry (e.g., Barrett & Finlay, 2018; Gross & 
Canteras, 2012; Iwata & LeDoux, 1988; Tovote et al., 2015). Behavioral experiments also 
clearly show that the variation within emotion categories is meaningfully tied to context and 
situational factors and is not merely due to variability in the experimental method. A growing 
number of studies of emotion are designed to explicitly model and capture heterogeneity within 
emotion categories both within individuals and across cultures (e.g., Ceulemans, Kuppens, & 
Van Mechelen, 2012; Gendron, Roberson, van der Vyver, & Barrett, 2014; 2014; Hortensius, 
Schutter, & Harmon-Jones, 2012; Kuppens, Van Mechelen, & Rijmen, 2008; Kuppens et al., 
2007; Nezlek, Vansteelandt, Van Mechelen, & Kuppens, 2008; Stemmler, Aue, & Wacker, 
2007; Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, & Barsalou, 2013; 2015; Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, 
Simmons, & Barsalou, 2011).  
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Box 9: Emotional Episodes and Their Affective Features 
 In English, the word “affect” means “to produce a change.” To be affected by something 
is to be influenced by it. In science, and particularly in psychology, “affect” refers to a special 
kind of influence—something’s ability to influence your mind in a way that is linked to changes 
in your body. Sometimes “affect” is used as a cautious term, to mean anything emotional. It 
allows people to refer to emotions in general terms, without specifying exactly what an emotion 
is or how it should be defined. Sometimes “affect” is used to refer specifically to emotional 
experiences – to be affected is to feel something (e.g., Panksepp, 1998). In modern psychological 
usage, “affect” refers to the mental counterpart of internal bodily sensations, whether or not those 
sensations are associated with emotions. Historically, “affect” referred to simple feelings that are 
part of every waking moment of your life (Wundt, 1998b/1897; for a discussion, see Barrett & 
Bliss-Moreau, 2009). This allows us to clarify some persistent confusions that muddle the 
scientific study of emotions and their expressions. 
Affective Features 
Affect is a property of consciousness (e.g., Edelman & Tononi, 2000; James, 1890; 
Searle, 1992, 2004) and is not synonymous with emotion. More than a century of research has 
revealed that affect, whether part of an emotional episode or otherwise, can be described as a 
single point in a space described by at least two features: valence (pleasure to displeasure), 
arousal (high to low), although other features are sometimes discussed (interpersonal closeness 
to distance, dominance to submissiveness, effort to effortlessness, etc.; Barrett, Mesquita et al., 
2007; Cowen & Keltner, 2017; Russell & Barrett, 1999). Valence and arousal are not ingredients 
of affect nor processes that cause affect. They are descriptive features of what a moment of 
consciousness feels like. They are descriptive features of emotional instances (Box 2), but they 
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are not specific to emotion. These two features of affect form a low-dimensional, circular space 
that describes how a person feels at any moment in time, as in Box Figure 9-1. Valence and 
arousal are not independent from one another (as one feature changes, so does the other; for a 
discussion, see Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Kuppens et al., 2013).  
Thus far, what we understand about the brain-basis of affect (e.g., Lindquist et al., 2016) 
is consistent with the hypothesis that affective feelings are associated with a wide range of 
psychological phenomena (reviewed in Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009). Valence and arousal are 
likely low dimensional representations of internal bodily sensations (referred to as interoception; 
Craig, 2015) that result from the constantly changing state of the body’s internal systems, such as 
the autonomic nervous system, the immune system, the endocrine system, and so on (referred to 
as allostasis; Sterling, 2012). Somehow, bodily sensations, which are physical, are transformed 
into affective feelings, which are mental. Scientists don’t yet know how this transformation 
happens, but many studies suggest that it does. For the moment, it remains one of the mysteries 
of consciousness (but see Tye, 2018, for a recent attempt at solving this mystery). 
Emotional Episodes 
Affect provides a quick summary of the physiological state of the body, like a barometer, 
without much detail (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Russell, 2003). Therefore, affect alone does 
not indicate what to do next, or how to act, other than to approach something or avoid it 
(Davidson, 1992; Lang et al., 1993). Many scientists propose that emotional episodes, on the 
other hand, are specific instances of affect that involve very specific intentions to act. The 
relation of affect to action preparation depends on how emotion is defined (various theoretical 
proposals are presented in Box 2).  
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Box Figure 9-1. The affective circumplex. Hedonic valence is represented on the horizontal axis and arousal on the 
vertical axis. Reprinted, with permission, from Barrett, L. F., & Bliss-Moreau, E. (2009). Affect as a psychological 
primitive. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 41, pp. 167–218). Burlington, 
MA: Academic Press. Copyright © 2009 Elsevier, Inc. 
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Box 10: Learning to Express and Perceive Emotions 
Expressing Emotion 
Increasingly, scientists have been riveted by discoveries that very young human infants 
are powerful learners who quickly learn and make use of cues from their environments. When 
children begin to produce facial movements during emotional episodes with some regularity, 
they appear to reflect the influences of learning about cultural and social expectations (for 
review, see Kärtner, Holodynski, & Wörmann, 2013). For example, social smiling is often 
described as a purely maturational phenomenon, but recent cross-cultural studies suggest its 
development is influenced by sociocultural factors (see Wörmann, Holodynski, Kärtner, & 
Keller, 2012). Children are sensitive to variations in the distribution of multimodal sensory 
changes in their environments, and this variation becomes reflected in the perceptual categories 
that children form for facial movements (Pollak & Kistler, 2002). Infants generalize from small 
samples to larger populations and gauge their inferences depending upon whether sampling 
strategies are strong or weak (Denison, Reed & Xu, 2013; Gweon, Tenenbaum & Schulz, 2010). 
Young children are also able detect complex probabilistic information in their environments, as 
well as implicitly learn and reproduce the underlying statistical distributions (Plate et al., 2017). 
These studies suggest that the patterns of facial communication are readily learned by children 
from their social environments, likely beginning shortly after birth. As noted by Sullivan and 
Lewis (2003), how specific patterns of facial movements become associated with specific 
contexts is still unresolved.  
There is some evidence that infants learn to express instances of emotion with facial 
movements as they begin to acquire the emotion concepts of their cultural context. For example, 
recent studies suggest the facial configuration proposed as the expression of disgust (see Figure 4 
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in main article) is learned in middle childhood as children acquire their culture’s concept for 
disgust (Stevenson, Oaten, Case, Repacholi & Wagland, 2010; Widen & Russell, 2013).8 Further 
details remain unknown however, due to a gap in the scientific literature. Published studies that 
carefully describe a child’s facial muscle movements during emotional episodes have not yet 
directly measured individual differences in emotion concept learning, nor variation in parenting 
or family environment that serves as the context to learn emotion concepts. Studies that have 
examined the link between how children move their faces during emotional episodes and how 
their parents act during emotional situations unfortunately do not precisely quantify the facial 
muscle movements. 
Emotion Perception 
It is generally well-accepted that infants begin by implicitly perceiving broad affective 
distinctions (e.g., positive-negative; approach-avoid; pleasant-unpleasant) as discussed in the 
main text of the article. Additional research is required to understand the developmental 
trajectory of infants’ implicit emotion perceptions. More is known about the development of 
children’s explicit emotion perception capacities. Numerous experiments now suggest that very 
young children do not explicitly understand the emotional meaning of facial movements, but that 
this is a skill they learn over the course of development (Pollak & Kistler, 2002). That is, 
newborns appear to learn to detect faces and facial movements in the first few days of life, but 
                                                 
8 These studies focus on learning the association between emotion words and facial movements. However, as we 
describe below, other theorists (e.g., Röttger‐Rössler et al. 2015) have proposed that infants begin learning 
associations between faces and other nonverbal emotion components during early interactions with their caregivers. 
In this manner, caregivers might shape infants’ nonverbal emotion concepts. For example, adults might respond to 
infants’ diffuse responses to emotion eliciting situations by producing specific facial movements and behavioral 
responses of their own. Thus, probabilistic learning from the environment could result in the infant learning emotion 
categories, which might be considered “concepts” as well (Pollak, 2009). Still, there is little direct evidence with 
respect to distinguishing among different negative emotions concepts in infancy. 
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their capacity to associate these movements with the emotional meaning (i.e., to see facial 
movements as emotional expressions) is learned during childhood.  
One careful line of research provides robust, consistent evidence for this hypothesis 
(reviewed in Widen, 2016). In this research, young children are shown the proposed expressive 
forms in Figure 4 and are asked to freely label them as emotional expressions by nominating 
emotion words. Almost twenty experiments now suggest that North American toddlers make 
broad affective distinctions (e.g., feels pleasant-feels unpleasant) when explicitly labeling the 
facial configurations, but these perceptions narrow and become more emotionally differentiated 
(more emotionally granular) as children’s emotion concepts develop (again, see Widen, 2016). 
Summarizing across eleven different published studies observing over 1,000 children ranging in 
age from two to nine years old, it is possible to discern an average developmental trajectory from 
affect perception to emotion perception (see Box Figure 10-1). Children’s perceptions begin to 
differentiate around the age of two years of age and continue becoming more specific until the 
middle school years when they look more adult-like (for a review, see Widen, 2016). Even 
elementary school-aged children commonly label disgust as “anger”, and when asked to select 
disgust from standardized sets of facial configurations, improvement with age is very gradual, 
with only about 50% of nine year olds offering the word “disgusted” (or a close synonym) for 
the proposed disgust expression (Widen & Russell 2013). There is growing evidence that  
Nonetheless, some scientists argue that more specific aspects of emotion perception are 
operating much earlier in development than the above studies seem to suggest (e.g., Izard et al., 
2010; Leppänen & Nelson, 2009). For example, Grossmann (2010) suggests that by age three 
months infants can distinguish the proposed expressive configurations for happiness, surprise, 
and anger, and that by seven months they can discriminate the proposed expressive 
configurations for fear, sadness, and interest. These hypotheses suggest the interesting possibility 
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that emotion perception might be observed much earlier than two years of age using methods 
that do not require children to overtly label faces depicting emotional expressions. Once again, 
we see that the choice of stimuli and task design can yield substantially different conclusions.  
Grossmann’s hypotheses are also consistent with other evidence suggesting that infants 
and young children may implicitly perceive emotion in facial movements when assessed with the 
habituation task or a perceptual matching task. Left uncertain is whether, beyond discriminating 
between different facial movements, infants understand the emotional meaning that is typically 
inferred from these cues.  
Box Figure 10-1. Developmental trajectories for emotion concept acquisition. N = 1065. From an early age, children 
used the expected emotion labels (with standard errors) for the smiling facial configuration (“happiness”), the 
scowling configuration (“anger”), and the frowning configuration (“sadness”) but the expected emotion labels for 
the other facial configurations gradually increased with age. Data from 11 studies were aggregated (for details, see 
Widen, 2016). The N for each age group was: two years (N=94), three years (N=229), four years (N=299), five 
years (N=209), six years (N=74), seven years (N=66), eight years (N=61), and nine years (n=33). © 2016 Guilford 
Press. Adapted and reprinted with permission of Guilford Press from Widen, S. C. (2016). The development of 
children’s concepts of emotion. In L. F. Barrett, M. Lewis, J. M., & Haviland-Jones (Eds.), Handbook of emotions 
(4th ed., pp. 307–318). New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
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Box 11: Research with Virtual Humans 
Virtual humans (Rickel et al., 2002) (or Embodied Conversational Agents, Cassell et al., 
2000) are software-based artifacts that not only look like people but are also engineered to 
interact with us using the same verbal and nonverbal behavior that we use to interact with each 
other. To support interaction, virtual humans are designed with a range of technologies that allow 
them to interpret a human’s behavior, maintain beliefs about the interaction, reason about how to 
achieve their goals given those beliefs and express themselves to achieve those goals. This 
requires the researcher to engineer virtual humans to simulate perception, beliefs, goals and 
behavior, bringing together theory and scientific insights spanning traditional scientific 
disciplines. For example, to model emotion expression and perception in a virtual human, a 
designer may consider the interactions between the simulations of emotion with those for 
perception, decision-making, behavior and consequently social interaction (Rickel et al., 2002; 
Becker-Asano & Wachsmuth, 2008).  
In the process of crafting a virtual human, a designer is exploring challenges from an 
engineering perspective that are closely tied to fundamental psychological questions about the 
mechanisms and processes that underlie mental events, such as how should a virtual human’s 
internal states such as emotions and communicative intentions map to its expressive behavior in 
the context of a social interaction? A designer must also grapple with questions about the 
mechanisms and processes that infer emotional meaning from facial movements (i.e., emotion 
perception), such as how should a virtual human interpret its perceptions of another’s facial 
movements and what role should its prior beliefs, goals, emotions and the context of the 
interaction play in that interpretation? Virtual human designs vary considerably in the details of 
the mechanisms and processes used to perform these tasks. They may seek to simulate how these 
inference processes work, for example how do prior beliefs bias interpretations. They may use 
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machine learning approaches to acquire a model from human behavioral data. At another 
extreme, the designer may more simply use a canned or fixed approach that makes specific 
inferences in specific situations.  
There are some unique challenges when considering how to engineer emotion 
expressions and perceptions, because often the goal is not to faithfully render human behavior as 
it occurs in everyday life, but to implement them in a virtual human to achieve some other 
scientific or applied goal. For example, the design of a child’s virtual tutor (Lester et al. 1997) 
may employ exaggerated, unambiguous or supernormal nonverbal behavior to motivate the 
student. Nonetheless, in other cases, psychological realism in the virtual human’s nonverbal 
behavior, as well as accurate inferences about the human’s nonverbal behavior, is often 
desirable, such as in systems that are designed to train social skills, where it is crucial to teach 
the ability to effectively use movements, like facial movements, as well as the ability to infer 
their psychological meaning (Kron et al., 2017). In some cases, psychological realism is 
paramount, as when virtual humans are designed to elicit behavior in a human interaction partner 
that allows the assessment of depression (Devault et al, 2015).  
Mapping the virtual human’s simulated internal states to its movements 
Often the realization of expressive behavior in a virtual human involves two connected 
computational models. There is the model of the emotion elicitation that determines the virtual 
human’s internal, mental states, in essence simulating how the virtual human’s experiences elicit 
the internal emotional states it “feels.” In addition, there is a model that maps those states to the 
behaviors or physical movements such as facial actions designed to express those states. Some 
studies also endow virtual humans with the capacity to regulate their emotion simulations 
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(Marsella & Gratch, 2009), allowing the face to dynamically portray episodes of both 
authentically “felt” emotion and strategically intended emotional expressions. 
Simulating emotional states. The design of the computational models of emotion elicitation used 
in these systems (Dias & Paiva, 2005; Marsella & Gratch, 2009; Becker-Asano & Wachsmuth, 
2008) have been most heavily influenced by appraisal theories (See Box 2). Appraisal theories 
are popular in computational models in virtual human research because each appraisal (e.g., 
pleasantness, novelty, etc.) maps readily to formalisms used in Artificial Intelligence to model 
internal states such as beliefs, desires and intentions.9 
The computational models of emotion elicitation used in virtual humans have not been 
empirically validated against human data, except for a few notable exceptions. For example, one 
study compared human self-reports of their changing emotional experience over the course of 
playing the two-person competitive game of Battleship to the predictions of alternative 
computational models of emotion (Gratch et al., 2009). A related study (Marsella et al, 2009) 
evaluated a computational model, EMA, (EMotion and Adaptation, inspired by the appraisal 
model developed by Lazarus, 1991) that could simulate an emotional episode and regulate the 
simulation. Again, the game of Battleship was used. In both cases, the subjective reports of 
emotional experience at key points in the unfolding game were compared to the model’s 
predictions for those experiences (i.e., what the model predicted the real human would feel and 
how the person would regulate those feelings). In both cases evidence was found supporting 
aspects of the various models while also identifying some discrepancies between subjects’ 
subjective report and model predictions. For example, EMA correctly predicted the changes in 
                                                 
9 Interestingly, many of the computational models have been based on appraisal models, such as Ortony, Clore & 
Collins (1988). However, the computational work has treated it as a causal model, so that the appraisals are the sole 
cause of emotions, even though the work of Ortony et al was designed as a descriptive model. 
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subjective reports of emotion intensity, as well as changes in subject’s reports of their effort to 
win and the importance of winning, in the service of regulating their emotions. However, it 
incorrectly predicted that subjects would engage in wishful thinking, increasing their 
expectations of eventually winning, in the face of evidence that they were actually losing. In fact, 
when faced with losing, subjects tended to lower their expectations of winning, perhaps again as 
a means to down regulate the eventual negative emotions that would result from losing.  
Mapping states to movements. Once an emotion simulation is implemented, another 
model is used to express the simulated emotions in the virtual human’s movements, including 
facial actions. Expression stereotypes (see Figure 4) have frequently been used to map the 
simulated emotions provided by these computational models to facial actions made by virtual 
humans. The component process model of emotion (Scherer et al., 2017) has also been explored 
by tying the virtual human’s facial actions to the simulated appraisals generated by its emotion 
model (Paleari et al, 2007; Malatesta et al, 2009).  
Data-driven techniques provide an alternative to theory driven approaches. One approach 
to using data is to depend on other people’s beliefs about which facial movements express 
emotion, rather than to rely on scientists. For example, posed expressions from actors can be 
digitally scanned, creating visually realistic faces with posed facial actions (Alexander et al., 
2009) that in appearance can be indistinguishable from humans.10 However, the goal here is 
typically grounded in perception, as opposed to physical realism. Specifically, the facial 
movements and their dynamics, as expressions of emotion, are based on beliefs, stereotypes or 
artistic interpretation, with an underlying expectation that a human user will infer emotional 
                                                 
10 Digital scanning enables film makers to fool audiences so that, for example, they can bring an actor back to life, 
twenty years after his death, as was done in the recent Hollywood film, Rogue One, when Peter Cushing (who 
played a general in the Empire) made an appearance. 
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL – Facial Expression of Emotions 50 
 
 
 
meanings from those movements. The main weakness in these approaches is ecological – as we 
discuss in the main text of the paper, people’s beliefs about emotional expressions are often 
better thought of as stereotypes and may not accurately capture how they actually move their 
faces when expressing emotion in real life. An alternative data-driven approach, one with greater 
potential for ecological validity, is to record people’s facial movements while they are engaged 
in situations that are assumed to evoke emotion, either in the lab or in everyday life, but this 
requires inferring which emotional episodes are being created (for a discussion on the difficulties 
in measuring an emotional episode, see discussion in the main paper). 
To date, there is no strong empirical evidence that compares these alternative models of 
expressing emotions in terms of the psychological realism of the facial movements they generate.  
An additional challenge is the mismatch between abstract details provided by a 
psychological hypothesis and the far more specific engineering details about the appearance of 
the character’s face, skin, as well as realizing realistic dynamics for the individual facial actions 
required to animate a virtual human’s face. Those dynamics include not only timing of each 
action unit, but also its duration and the rates at which it moves. Furthermore, the dynamics of 
the action units must influence other elements, such as the bunching and wrinkling of skin. 
Beyond realizing one configuration of facial movements, there is also sequencing of the 
movements over time, such as when initial surprise may transition into an instance of fear or 
anger. Such dynamics encompass not only the facial movements themselves but also the 
dynamics of the underlying mental states that are being expressed. These factors are all critical to 
getting a realistic effect. That is, basic emotion theory and the componential model of emotion 
describe their hypotheses in terms of abstract (non-physical) processes, not the physical 
mechanisms by which movements or simulations are realized. This requires designers to make 
inferences as they build computational models. As a consequence, in a given study, it is difficult 
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to infer whether the results pertain to the engineering choices made to realize a psychological 
theory or more generally to the theory itself. 
More broadly, mapping a virtual human’s simulated internal states to its movements is, in 
fact, more complex than simply connecting the emotion simulation (as an output of an emotion 
elicitation model) to physical movements (as an output of an expression model). Virtual humans 
are designed to engage us in face-to-face interaction. As in human-to-human social interactions, 
facial movements in a virtual human-to-human interaction serve a variety of functions, such as 
establishing rapport by mirroring the human participants’ behavior (Huang et al., 2011; Tickle-
Degnen & Rosenthal, 1990), emphasizing something with shared attention (Ekman, 1979), 
regulating turn-taking in the interaction, greetings, communicating attitudes, and so on (Cafaro et 
al., 2017).  
Endowing a virtual human with the capacity to infer emotions from facial movements 
Virtual humans often are designed to infer psychological meaning in the nonverbal 
movement of real humans and use those inferences to inform how they interact. This involves 
two connected technologies: technologies to sense facial movements, and a model of emotion 
perception that determines the virtual human’s emotion inferences about what those states mean.  
In drawing emotional inferences about a human’s facial movements, virtual human 
designs have typically exploited standard technologies that rely on data-driven machine learning 
techniques discussed earlier. For example, the SimSensei virtual human system was designed to 
interview patients suffering from depression and post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD), as well 
as nonpatients, asking people questions such as “What is your dream job?”, “What do you do 
now?” and “Tell me about something you did recently that you really enjoyed?” (Devault et al., 
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2015). A range of sensing technologies were used to measure, for example, smile 
intensity/duration (OKAO11), facial actions & emotion (FACET12) and acoustic/vocal qualities13. 
 Wörtwein & Scherer (2017) reports on another study that used the SimSensei virtual 
human. The focus of the study was to discover which questions asked by the virtual human and 
which nonverbal actions emitted by the participants were most diagnostic of whether or not a 
given test-subject was suffering from PTSD. Questions were ranked in terms of information 
gained14 to discover the most diagnostic nonverbal actions associated with that information. For 
example, depending on the question, reduced variability of movement (they moved the facial 
feature less), or reduced average displacement for facial actions AU1, AU2, AU9, AU17, AU18 
and AU26 was found to be correlated with PTSD. Interestingly, which facial actions were more 
diagnostic depended on the question, leading the researchers to suggest that context matters in 
the sense that the specific context of the question being asked determined what facial actions 
were most diagnostic of PTSD.  
 More recent work has begun to explore how a virtual human’s model of the human can 
help bias the inferences of the human’s mental states. For example, to the extent the virtual 
human has a model of the goals and beliefs of the human, it can use a theory of emotion15 to 
predict how the human may emotionally react and use those predictions to refine its 
interpretation of the human’s facial movements as well as use the movements to refine its model 
of the human’s beliefs and goals (Alfonso et al., 2015). In addition, the virtual human can 
                                                 
11 //www.omron.com/r d/coretech/vision/okao.html  
12 http : //www.emotient.com/ 
13 http : //www.cogitocorp.com/  
14 See the discussion of information theory in Box 16. 
15 In the two works we cite here (Alfonso et al, 2015; Yongsatianchot & Marsella, 2016), variants of appraisal 
theories were used to provide the virtual agent with a folk theory of emotion. Alfonso et al (2015) used a model 
inspired by Smith & Lazarus (1990) and Roseman (2001) while Yongsatianchot & Marsella (2016) used a model 
inspired by Ortony et al., (1988) 
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acquire and refine over the course of an interaction how a specific human tends to move his face 
during a situation thought to evoke emotions (Yongsatianchot & Marsella, 2016).  
Should we care about the impact of virtual human technology?  
Virtual humans provide an important tool for studying the human perception of emotion 
in the laboratory. However, they are likely to have an additional, broader social impact. As these 
systems increasingly play a role in our day-to-day lives, they are likely to have a significant 
impact on our culture. For example, major corporations such as Microsoft and Amazon are 
exploring the use of virtual humans in a range of business and home applications, suggesting that 
virtual humans increasingly will integrate with our everyday life. A valuable lesson is to be 
learned from the study of how television watching hinders children’s ability to infer emotion in 
facial movements in natural settings (Coats et al., 1999). We might similarly expect the design of 
virtual humans to impact how we perceive emotion in one another. One might even expect the 
impact to be more profound and immediate than passive watching of television since virtual 
humans are designed to engage us in an interaction. 
More specifically, virtual humans are being designed to train social skills that have 
significant real-world consequences, such as medical student’s bedside manner (Kron et al, 
2017) or a soldier’s ability to cross-culturally negotiate (Kim et al, 2009; Traum et al., 2003). 
These systems either implicitly or explicitly seek to teach when to express emotion and infer 
emotions from expressions, in highly critical situations such as informing patients that they have 
a life-threatening disease. As part of the learning process, the system can try to assess and seek to 
improve the learner’s ability to infer emotion from the virtual human’s expression as well as to 
express their emotion in ways the system design deems is appropriate. Clearly, the models of 
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expression production and recognition that are incorporated into the system will impact what is 
learned. 
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Box 12: The In-Group Advantage in Emotion Perception 
People’s perceptions of emotion are in better agreement with scientists’ expectations 
when judging facial configurations like those in Figure 4 of the main article when they are posed 
by members of their own culture or heritage. This phenomenon is referred to as an in-group 
advantage (Elfenbein, 2017; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002a, 2002b, 2003), suggesting that people 
are better able to infer emotional states from configurations of muscle movements when they are 
more familiar with the structural features of the faces they are asked to label (Neth & Martinez, 
2010). The in-group advantage hypothesis is consistent with findings that perceptual learning 
plays an important role in perceiving emotion. Perceptual learning may be necessary for making 
sense of even the most basic visual details in photographs. For example, it is only when we are 
familiar with other people that we realize that different photos of the same person are, in fact, the 
same person (i.e., perceptual learning and familiarity are necessary to categorize faces by 
identity; Beale & Keil, 1995; Jenkins, White, Monfort, & Burton, 2011; McKone, Martini & 
Nakayama, 2001; Viviani, Binda & Bosato, 2007; for a discussion of how familiarity is 
important for face perception, see Young & Burton, 2017).  
  
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL – Facial Expression of Emotions 56 
 
 
 
Box 13: Some Details of the Emotion Perception Studies by Crivelli and Colleagues 
 Crivelli and colleagues have published three articles examining emotion perception in 
small-scale, remote cultural contexts that are relevant to the main article. If we only pay attention 
to the reliability with which participants inferred an emotional cause for the facial configurations 
in Figure 4, then these experiments appear to provide moderate support for the common view 
that anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise each are expressed with the facial 
configurations in Figure 4. But a closer examination of the specificity, in addition to reliability, 
makes it clear that these studies are strongly inconsistent with the common view.  
Crivelli, C., Jarillo, S., Russell, J. A., & Fernández-Dols, J. M. (2016). Reading emotions from 
faces in two indigenous societies. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 145(7), 830-
843. 
In Study 1 of Crivelli, Jarillo, et al. (2016), photographs of six posed facial configurations 
similar to those in Figure 4 (main article) were spread before participants from the Trobriand 
Islands. Participants were asked to point to the person who felt a specific emotion (so, this was a 
choice-from-array task: matching facial configurations to words).  
 Reliability Specificity  
Smiling  Labeled as happiness (.58 [.39, .74]) Labeled as anger (.20 [.09, .38]) 
Pouting  Labeled as sadness (.46 [.29, .65]) Labeled as fear (.27 [.13, .46]) 
Gasping Labeled as fear (.31 [.16, .50]) Labeled as anger (.30), disgust (.29) 
Nose-scrunch  Labeled as disgust (.25) Labeled as fear (.27), sad (.23), anger (.20) 
Scowling  Labeled as anger (.07) Labeled as disgust (.08) 
Results from Table 1 of Crivelli et al., Study 1. Facial configurations are listed in the first column. 95% confidence 
intervals (CIs) presented in square brackets. 
 
There was above chance reliability and specificity for smiling as an expression of happiness. This result 
may support the common view, but it also has an untested alternative explanation: the study included only 
one pleasant category (happiness) and therefore participants were required to pick a smile from among 
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faces depicting unpleasant states. Participants may have been able to pick the correct face based on 
valence alone.  
Crivelli, Jarillo et al. (2016) Study 2 used the same method (matching faces to words), except that 
some participants saw posed static photographs of facial configurations and some saw posed dynamic 
videos. Participants were the Mwani of Mozambique and the experiment was conducted in their native 
language (Kimwani). There was no difference between the static and dynamic conditions. Only the static 
condition is discussed here for brevity.  
 Reliability Specificity  
Smiling  Labeled as happiness (.58) Labeled as sadness (.21) 
Pouting  Labeled as sadness (.16) Labeled as anger (.16), fear (.16), disgust (.32) 
Gasping Labeled as fear (.58)  Labeled as anger (.21) 
Nose-scrunch  Labeled as disgust (.37) Labeled as sadness (.16), anger (.32), fear 
(.11) 
Scowling  Labeled as anger (.26) Labeled as happiness (.11), sadness (.16), fear 
(.11), disgust (.11) 
Results from Table 5, of Crivelli et al., Study 2. Facial configurations are listed in the first column. The Specificity 
column lists results that are not statistically different from those in the Reliability column. 
 
No facial configuration was labeled specifically as hypothesized. The results for the dynamic 
facial configurations was similar, except that the smiling configuration was specifically labeled as 
happiness, which is tempered by an alternative explanation (perceiving valence).  
Crivelli, C., Russell, J. A., Jarillo, S., & Fernández-Dols, J. M. (2016). The fear gasping face as a threat 
display in a Melanesian society. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113(44), 12403-
12407.  
In this study, Trobriand Islanders were asked to point to the posed facial configuration of a person 
who felt a specific emotion designated by an emotion word (in the emotion condition) or who was 
communicating a specific social motive designated by a word (in the social motive condition). 
Participants could select a facial configuration from an array of six, pick a card with a black cross 
meaning “face not present in the array,” or answer that they did not know the response. 
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 Reliability Specificity  
Smiling  Labeled as happiness (1.0)  
Pouting  Labeled as sadness (.53 [.15, .57]) Labeled as hunger (.31), fear (.25), 
submission (.25) 
Gasping Labeled as fear (.39)  Labeled as anger (.56), threat (.69) 
Nose-scrunch  Labeled as disgust (.22) Labeled as fear (.28), rejection (.56) 
Scowling  Labeled as anger (.06) Labeled as disgust (.36), hunger (.14), help 
(.19), submission (.14), rejection (.22), about 
to eat (.19) 
Results from Table S1, of Crivelli et al. Facial configurations are listed in the first column. The Specificity column 
lists results that are not statistically different from those in the Reliability column. 
 
There was strong reliability and above chance specificity for smiling as an expression of 
happiness, which is tempered by an alternative explanation (perception of valence). 
Crivelli, C., Russell, J. A., Jarillo, S., & Fernández-Dols, J. M. (2017). Recognizing spontaneous facial 
expressions of emotion in a small-scale society of Papua New Guinea, Emotion, 17(2), 337-347. 
In Study 1, Trobriand Islanders were asked to freely label spontaneous expressions of happiness, 
sadness, anger, surprise and disgust produced by the Fore people of Papua New Guinea; the photographs 
were labeled by and published by Ekman (1980).  
 Reliability Specificity  
Smiling  Labeled as happiness (.13 [.04, .29]) Labeled as laughing or smiling (.44) 
Pouting  Labeled as sadness (.16 [.06, .32] Labeled as avoidance (.19) 
Startled Labeled as surprise (.00)  Labeled as avoidance (.19), sadness (.16) 
Nose-scrunch  Labeled as disgust (.06 [.01, .21]), Labeled as avoidance (.22) 
Scowling  Labeled as anger (.03 [.00, .17]) Labeled as avoidance (.56) 
Results from Table 1, of Crivelli et al., Study 1. Facial configurations are listed in the first column. The Specificity 
column lists results that are not statistically different from those in the Reliability column. 
 
No spontaneous expression was labeled as predicted by Ekman (1980) or by the common view. 
 
In Study 2 of Crivelli at al. (2017), Trobriand Islanders matched posed facial configurations to 
emotion labels that were provided by the experimenter (i.e., they performed the matching faces to words 
method that was used in Crivelli, Jarillo et al., 2016). According to the paper, “The response format 
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consisted of nine written terms. Five of the labels were predicted by Ekman (1980): mwasawa 
(happiness), ninamwau (sadness), leya (anger), eyowa lopola (surprise, startle), and minena (disgust). 
Two of the labels were Study 1’s modal categories: gigila (laughing, smiling) and gibulwa (feels like 
avoiding social interaction). And, two of the remaining labels were itwali (other emotion) and gala 
anukwali (I do not know). On the actual questionnaire, only the Kilivila terms were listed. The items were 
always presented in the same order: gilbuwa, ninamwau/mwau, minena, eyowa lopola, gigila, leya, 
mwasawa, itwali, and gala anukwali.” 
 Reliability Specificity  
Smiling  Labeled as happiness (.17 [.06, .37]) Labeled as laughing, smiling (.69), sadness 
(.13) 
Pouting  Labeled as sadness (.29 [.15, .49]) Labeled as anger (.17), surprise (.17) 
Startled Labeled as surprise (.21 [.09, .41])  Labeled as sadness (.21), happiness (.13), 
avoidance (.17) 
Nose-scrunch  Labeled as disgust (.38 [.21, .57]) Labeled as avoidance (.33) 
Scowling  Labeled as anger (.13 [.04, .32]) Labeled as sadness (.29), avoidance (.50) 
Results from Table 3 of Crivelli et al., Study 2. Facial configurations are listed in the first column. The Specificity 
column lists results that are not statistically different from those in the Reliability column. 
 
No spontaneous expression was labeled as predicted by the common view. The smiling 
configuration was consistently chosen as the expression for “happy” just barely above chance, but was 
also labeled sadness as frequently. The smiling configuration was also labeled as laughter more reliably 
than it was labeled “happy,” replicating Study 1. The pouting configuration did not meet the specificity 
criterion; proportionally, participants were just as likely to label a pouting face as anger or surprise. The 
startled configuration (proposed as the surprise expression) was as reliably labeled as sadness, happiness 
or “feels like avoiding a situation” as it was labeled surprise. A nose-wrinkled configuration (the proposed 
disgust expression) was consistently labeled as “disgust” better than what would be expected by chance, 
but it was not specifically (uniquely) labeled as “disgust,” as it was just as often labeled as “feels like 
avoiding a social interaction.” 
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Box 14: The Power of Words in Emotion Perception Experiments 
It has long been known that choice-from-array methods provide observations supportive 
of the common view when other experimental methods do not (see main article and Box 4 for 
discussion). One hypothesis is that choice-from-array tasks provide perceivers with emotion 
words with a psychological impact that extends beyond just constraining participants’ word 
choice – emotion words may actually help participants to form reliable emotion inferences.  
Words Support Perception 
Many experiments now show that words have a more basic function in supporting 
perception, even for unfamiliar objects (Lupyan, Rakison & McClelland, 2007), contradicting 
the widespread assumption that people simply learn names for categories they already know, and 
supporting the hypothesis that words shape how categories are learned in the first place (Gelman 
& Roberts, 2017; Waxman & Gelman, 2010). Consistent with these broader findings, emotion 
words have been shown to shape how participants perceive and even literally see faces (Gendron 
et al., 2012) because they influence how people encode and remember facial features (Fugate et 
al., 2010, 2018; Doyle & Lindquist, 2018). Additional evidence also shows that the conceptual 
knowledge linked to words dynamically shapes the perception of facial configurations: when 
participants believe that two emotion categories are conceptually more similar to one another, 
facial configurations depicting those categories were also perceived as more similar, even when 
controlling for the actual perceptual similarity of the facial configurations (using novel research 
methods like reverse correlation and computer mouse tracking; Brooks & Freeman, 2018).  
Words Invite Concept Learning 
Research shows that the words provided in choice-from-array tasks may actually quickly 
teach participants the expected answers in an experiment. Participants in an experiment might 
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see anywhere from a dozen to a hundred proposed expressive configurations, and for each one 
they see, the same handful of emotion words are presented over and over again. Under these 
conditions, participants quickly learn which words are supposed to correspond to each facial 
configuration. For example, children learn to label an artificially constructed facial expression 
(e.g., a blowfish expression) with the word “pax” in a choice from array task at levels that are 
comparable to the proposed expressive configurations in Figure 4 (Nelson & Russell, 2016). 
Participants also use a process of elimination strategy: words that are not chosen on prior trials 
are selected more frequently, inflating agreement levels (DiGirolamo & Russell, 2017).  
There is some evidence that choice-from-array tasks inadvertently allow participants to 
learn emotion categories during the course of an experiment. In a recent study, emotion 
categories that are untranslatable with a single word in English, in Mandarin Chinese and in 
Hadza culture (and that do not exist in those cultures) were presented to participants from those 
cultures in a choice-from-array task along with contrived cues (in this case, made up 
vocalizations). Participants free-labeling of the vocalizations indicated that they were unfamiliar 
with them; they did not label the vocalizations with words for the novel emotion concepts or with 
words for anger, disgust, fear, and so on. Nonetheless, participants labeled the vocalizations with 
reliability and specificity when they were offered the novel category words in a choice-from-
array task, making those emotion categories and their (completely made up) vocalizations appear 
universal (Hoemann, Crittenden, Ruark, Gendron, & Barrett, in press; also see Gendron et al., 
2015).  
Emotion Words, Emotion Concepts and Emotion Perception 
Developmental evidence is also consistent with the hypothesis that emotion words and 
associated conceptual knowledge play a powerful, and perhaps even necessary, role in emotion 
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perception. A careful line of research provides robust, replicable evidence that children implicitly 
learn the affective meaning of facial movements in infancy, but only learn to explicitly infer an 
emotional meaning for facial configurations when they acquire the relevant emotion concept (see 
Box 10). These studies also suggest that emotion words play an important role in the 
development of emotion perception during early and middle childhood. For example, children 
between the ages of three and ten find it easier to match an expressive stereotype to an emotion 
word than to another example of the same stereotype (i.e., children find it easier to match the 
word “angry” to a scowling face than to perceptually match two scowling faces; see Widen, 
2016). In a story-telling task, three and four-year-old children find it harder to state the cause of 
an expressive stereotype (e.g., a scowling face) than for an emotion word (e.g., angry) or a 
corresponding behavior (e.g., a scream) (Widen & Russell, 2004). This label superiority effect is 
robust and is observed in a variety of experiments (Balconi & Carrera, 2007; Camras & Allison, 
1985; Reichenbach & Masters, 1983; Russell & Widen, 2002a, 2002b; Widen & Russell, 2002, 
2004, 2010a, 2010b). Children between the ages of four and ten years of age find it more 
difficult to freely label an expression stereotype like those in Figure 4 than brief stories 
describing anger, fear, surprise, disgust, compassion, embarrassment, shame and contempt 
(where the stories do not contain any emotion label; Widen & Russell, 2010a); for example, 
children are more likely to freely offer the word “disgusted” (or a synonym) to label a story 
describing disgust than the stereotyped disgust expression (e.g., see also Camras & Allison, 
1985 N. Eisenberg, murphy, shepherd, 1997; for a review see Widen & Russell, 2013a). This 
phenomenon has been called a face inferiority effect. It suggests that the ability to infer emotions 
emerges later for facial movements than for stories, an effect that could result from a number of 
factors. 
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Figure 10-1 of Box 10 may reflect more about children’s’ ability to incorporate facial 
movements into their emotion concepts, rather than their acquisition of those concepts. This 
interpretation is suggested by the developmental trajectory of the human visual system during 
these same years (Mondloch et al., 2003). Adults process the configurations in Figure 4 
configurally (Martinez, 2017a; Neth & Martinez, 2009), meaning that they perceive second-order 
dependencies in image features (first-order dependencies involve the ordering of features (e.g., 
eyes on top of the nose on top of the mouth); second-order dependencies involve the relative 
distances between these features). There is some debate over when children become proficient in 
the visual interpretation of configural features (some evidence suggests at birth (Turati et al., 
2010) whereas other evidence suggests around eight years of age (Mondloch et al., 2003; Le 
Grand et al., 2004; Maurer et al., 2002; Sinha et al., 2006)).16 This may help to explain, at least in 
part, why children increasingly improve in their ability to match words to faces as they age. It 
may also help explain why toddlers (and even older children) have difficulty perceptually 
matching photos of different people who are posing the proposed expressive configurations for 
the same emotion category (e.g., different people scowling, different people frowning, etc.; 
Widen, 2016).17 
 Despite these ambiguities, it is possible that infants begin to learn emotion concepts and 
infer emotional meaning in facial movements earlier than they can explicitly label those 
movements with emotion words. One (as yet untested) hypothesis proposes that early in their 
development, infants hear emotion words being used by their parents and caregivers, and these 
                                                 
16 Experience with faces allows children to more quickly learn how to interpret the meaning of facial movements 
(Oakes & Ellis, 2013); scientists speculate that this experience allows children to differentiate facial information into 
categories that are functional in their social environments. 
17 It has been suggested that children have a difficult time perceptually matching faces because they are limited in 
their ability to process faces configurally (Pascalis et al., 2002). Configural processing is necessary to gain expertise 
in face recognition (Maurer et al., 2002) and plays an important role in the visual perception of emotion (Neth & 
Martinez, 2009). 
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emotion words serve to scaffold the ability of infants to begin to form emotion categories and 
learn emotion concepts (this idea is thought to operate more generally for other abstract 
categories and concepts; see Barrett, 2017a; Barrett et al., 2007; Lindquist & Gendron, 2013). 
 Words can initiate and scaffold the formation of concepts and categories (Balaban & 
Waxman, 1997; Waxman & Markow, 1995), particularly when the instances of a concept vary in 
how they look, sound and feel (as is the case with emotion concepts). These are called abstract or 
artifact categories. A growing body of research shows that infants and toddlers use words as a 
powerful tool for learning artifact or nominal kind categories (i.e., objects are treated as similar 
for performing some function when they are perceptually dissimilar; e.g., Fulkerson & Waxman, 
2007; Landau & Shipley, 2001; Plunkett et al. 2008; Addyman & Mareschal, 2010; Althaus & 
Westerman, 2016; Baldwin & Markman, 1989; Dewar & Xu, 2007, 2009; Welder & Graham, 
2006). It has been proposed that emotion words help children form emotion categories and learn 
emotion concepts precisely because emotion concepts are abstract concepts (Barrett, 2017; 
Barrett et al., 2007; Lindquist & Gendron, 2013). 
If variation is the norm when it comes to the instances of an emotion category (i.e., if the 
instances vary in the physical and psychological features), then emotion categories are abstract 
categories: people can tremble, jump, freeze, scream, gasp, hide, attack, and even laugh in the 
face of fear; the same appears to be true for anger. Physiological changes such as heart rate, 
breathing rate or blood pressure increase, decrease, or stay the same across instances of all 
emotion categories that have been studied (see Box 9). The variation is not random – it is 
situated -- and it is beyond what can be accounted for by common beliefs about emotion (see 
Box 2). The fact that the instances of an emotion category, like fear, can vary considerably in 
their facial movements, their physical changes, and their behaviors implies that when it comes to 
learning emotion concepts, children are faced with the task of making inferences about deeper 
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commonalities across perceptually variable instances (i.e., they must learn a nominal kind 
category). That is, they must learn that instances of fear belong to the same category because 
they serve the same purpose, even if those instances look, sound, and feel different.  
 
 
 
Evidence from Congenitally Deaf Children 
 
Another opportunity to study the role of emotion words and their associated concepts in 
emotion perception comes from observing children who are born deaf. Congenitally deaf 
children are often born to hearing parents who do not know sign language and who may 
subsequently struggle to learn it, reducing crucial opportunities to communicate with their 
infants early in life. Communication with parents and caregivers is the basis of emotion concept 
learning (Harris, de Rosnay, & Pons, 2016) and language learning (Kuhl, 2014) more generally, 
suggesting that congenitally deaf children who are born to non-signing, hearing parents might be 
slower to learn mental words and concepts. This may offer a window to observe the effects of 
early exposure to language, or its delay, on emotion perception competency. Numerous studies 
now show that congenitally deaf children who are born to non-signing, hearing parents have no 
opportunities to engage in or hear conversations about emotion or benefit from emotion labeling. 
These children are, in fact, slower to learn mental words and concepts because of this lack of 
access (e.g., Levrez et al., 2012; Remmel & Peters, 2008; Russell et al., 1998; Schick et al., 
2007; Steeds, Rowe, & Dowker, 1997). A variety of studies do, in fact, suggest that deaf children 
have a difficult time inferring emotions from scowls, frowns, smiles and so on, when compared 
to hearing children or children who are raised by parents who are fluent in sign language (for a 
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review of evidence, see Sidera et al., 2017). This difficulty extends to inferring mental causes for 
physical movements, more generally (e.g., Ludlow et al., 2012). 
Some scientists working in this area hypothesize that deaf children’s difficulty inferring 
emotion from facial movements is an example of their larger difficulties inferring mental events 
in general, primarily due to a delay in their ability to learn language (e.g., Dyck & Denver, 2003; 
Ludlow et al., 2010; Schick et al., 2007; Spencer & Marschark, 2010; Walker-Andrews & 
Lennon, 1991). Hearing children who are delayed in learning language also have difficulties 
inferring emotion from facial movements (Nelson et al., 2011). Taken together, then, this 
research is consistent with the hypothesis that emotion perception competency emerges in the 
context of word and concept learning. 
Summary 
Taken together, these findings suggest that emotion words are not psychologically inert – 
they may shape how emotion is inferred in facial movements and encourage participants to 
assign emotional meaning to facial configurations differently than they would if the words were 
not present. Since most of the studies that support the common view of emotion perception are 
choice-from-array tasks that include emotion words, the potency of those words provides an 
alternative explanation for the hundreds of studies that seem to strongly support the hypothesis 
that people perceive specific emotions in specific facial configurations with reliability. 
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Box 15: The Habituation Task Used in Studies of Emotion Perception in Infants 
The most popular experimental design that is used to study emotion perception in 
preverbal infants is called the habituation task. In a standard habituation task, an infant is 
presented with a stimulus that experimenters believe represents an emotion category (say, a 
scowling face to represent anger) and the infant will look at it. As subsequent stimuli are 
presented (say, a series of scowling faces), the infant is assumed to identify or categorize each 
face according to its emotional meaning. If the infant categorizes the stimuli as belonging to the 
same emotion category, it will look for a shorter amount of time (because the infant is presumed 
to become bored). Once the infant's looking time drops below a certain threshold, experimenters 
assume that the child is habituated to the emotion category (i.e., the infant has become 
uninterested in looking at “scowling faces”). Then, a new stimulus is presented, and looking time 
is again recorded (e.g., after a viewing a series of scowling faces, the infant is then shown a 
smiling face). If the infant looks for a longer time, scientists infer that she has categorized the 
stimulus as belonging to an emotion category that is different from before (i.e., the infant is 
assumed to be interested in novelty; this novelty is supposed to reflect a category difference in 
the context of the experiment).  
The habituation task obviously requires that the experimenter infer what looking times 
mean. Such inferences call for having strong alternative hypotheses that are, in practice, rarely 
considered. For example, the proposed expressive forms in Figure 4 differ in their familiarity 
(e.g., most infants are more familiar with smiling faces than with scowls or frowns). This makes 
it difficult to know which features of a face are holding an infant’s attention (familiarity or 
novelty) and can lead to potentially incorrect inferences. For example, several studies claim that 
infants are somehow born prepared to detect fearful faces. But the proposed expression for fear is 
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less familiar than “happy” faces; infants may look longer at them because they are attempting to 
learn novel stimuli (e.g., Bayet et al., 2017; see also Peltola et al., 2008, 2009).   
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Box 16: Information Theory as Applied to Emotion Communication 
An information theory approach to understanding emotional communication asks: what is 
the information that one person’s facial movements (the sender) convey to another person (the 
perceiver) in a particular context and how does that information help achieve synchrony between 
the sender and perceiver. The questions are cast in terms of how the sender and perceiver share 
information. The sender is communicating some information with his facial movements 
(sometimes emotional, sometimes not), and the perceiver uses that information to reduce 
uncertainty about what the sender is going to do next (in Western cultures, this typically means 
making a mental inference that allows the perceiver to predict the sender’s actions). For recent 
examples of experiments that use information theory as a scientific tool, see Jack & Schyns, 
(2017). 
This approach begins with the assumption that one person, the sender, is in some state of 
mind, makes some facial movements, and performs some action (speaks, moves his body, etc.) in 
a particular situation. The perceiver detects these movements and makes a prediction about what 
the sender will do next, often by making an inference about the sender’s state of mind. 
Communication of information between the sender and the perceiver is understood as mutual 
information, which is a symmetric measure of the information shared between two variables, X 
and Y. Specifically, mutual information is a measure of how much knowing value of one 
variable, X, tell us, reduces the uncertainty, about the value of the other variable, Y, and vice 
versa.  
Formally, mutual Information is a symmetric measure of the dependency between two 
random variables that provides a nonparametric way to assess how much knowing some random 
variable, Y, reduces the uncertainty about another random variable, X. Mutual information is 
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based on Shannon’s notion of information which is measured by entropy, H(X), a measure of the 
uncertainty of a random variable. Mutual Information, I(X;Y), is the reduction in uncertainty that 
results from knowing Y, I(X;Y) = H(X)-H(X|Y) (see Cover & Thomas 2006). If X and Y are 
independent events, knowing Y provides no information about X and the entropy H(X) is equal 
to the entropy H(X,Y) and I(X;Y) is zero. On the other hand, if knowing Y fully determines X 
and Y fully determines X, then the mutual information reduces to the entropy of X (or Y).  
When asking whether facial movements express an instance of a certain emotion category 
emotions, where X is the sender’s state of mind and Y is his facial movements, the forward 
inference is as follows: How much does X, his state of mind, reduce uncertainty about Y, his 
facial movements, perhaps measured with facial EMG? In the reverse inference, X is the 
sender’s facial movements and Y is his state of mind: How much does X, his facial movements, 
again measured with facial EMG, reduce uncertainty about his state of mind, Y?) 
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